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2Department of Neurology, University Hospital Center, Sart Tilman B30, 4000 Liège, Belgium
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Abstract
Masked prime tasks have shown that sensory information that has not been consciously perceived can nevertheless modulate
behavior. The neuronal correlates of behavioral manifestations of visuomotor priming remain debated, particularly with respect to the
distribution and direction (i.e. increase or decrease) of activity changes in medial frontal areas. Here, we predicted that these
discrepant results could be accounted for by two automatic and unconscious processes embedded in this task: response conflict and
facilitation. We used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), as 24 healthy participants had to respond, as fast
as possible, to a target arrow presented immediately after a subliminal masked prime arrow. There were three experimental
conditions defined by the prime–target relationship: compatible, incompatible, and neutral. The classical visuomotor priming effect
was reproduced, with relatively longer reaction times (RTs) in incompatible trials. Longer RTs in incompatible than in neutral trials
were specifically associated with stronger blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) activity in a conflict-related network comprising the
anterior cingulate cortex and right frontal associative areas. Motor response facilitation as shown by shorter RTs in compatible than in
neutral trials was associated with reduced activation in a motor preparation network including the medial and lateral premotor
cortices, as a result of the repetition suppression of the fMRI BOLD signal. The present results provide new insights into automatic
and unconscious visuomotor priming processes, suggesting an involvement of either a cognitive or motor network, depending on the
prime–target relationship.
Introduction
Making a movement in response to stimuli from our environment is
often described as being totally conscious and controlled. However, in
some situations, movements are not always consciously wished for.
There are many motor control disorders in which the patient cannot
abstain from making undesirable movements, as if they were
automatically activated without the possibility of being stopped.
Such an unconscious and automatic activation of the motor response
system does not necessarily require stimuli to be consciously
perceived. In the 1970s, researchers reported the case of a patient
with blindness secondary to primary visual cortex lesion who could
continue to differentiate, with a rather good accuracy, two stimuli
despite the fact that he claimed not to see them (Weiskrantz et al.,
1974). This unexpected phenomenon of ‘blindsight’ was one of the
first pieces of evidence suggesting the existence of a direct perceptuo-
motor link that allows visual information to directly activate motor
responses without conscious processing of the stimulus (Neumann,
1990). This hypothesis was later supported by experiments on healthy
subjects that used subliminal priming experiments involving various
visual stimuli, ranging from geometric shapes (Neumann & Klotz,
1994) or words (Dehaene et al., 1998) to more simple stimuli such as
arrows (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). In these visuomotor tasks,
participants are typically asked to make a rapid button press in
response to the display of a target stimulus to which it has been
previously assigned. Unbeknown to the subjects, each target stimulus
is immediately preceded by a brief masked prime stimulus presented
below the threshold of awareness. Behaviorally, the effect is similar
to what is typically observed in classic conflict tasks such as the
Eriksen flanker task (EFT) (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), subjects
responding faster and ⁄ or making fewer errors when the prime-
induced and target-induced responses are congruent than when they
differ.
In functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or electrophys-
iological experiments, this difference in reaction time (RT) has been
related to activity changes in the motor cortices (Dehaene et al., 1998;
Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998; Praamstra & Seiss, 2005), suggesting
that the activation induced by a masked prime spreads to the regions
involved in motor response execution. However, the involvement of
other cortical brain regions in subliminal motor priming has not yet
been clearly investigated. Unlike previous work, the present study was
designed to separate two distinct processes at both behavioral and
neuronal levels: response facilitation and conflict. We reasoned that
the RT difference between compatible and incompatible trials resulted
from both facilitation (i.e. in compatible trials) and conflict (i.e. in
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incompatible trials) effects. Here, these effects were dissociated by
incorporating neutral trials in the experimental paradigm, that is, using
masked prime stimuli that have not been associated with any motor
response. After assessing the main difference between compatible and
incompatible conditions at both the behavioral and fMRI levels, we
estimated the facilitation and conflict effects by comparing compatible
and incompatible conditions with the neutral condition, respectively.
On the basis of the results of a recent fMRI experiment from our group
(D’Ostilio & Garraux, 2011), we predicted that the facilitation effect
would be mediated, at least in part, in the medial premotor cortex
(MPMC). Because, in compatible trials, the masked prime and target
stimuli are identical, we hypothesized that activity in this region would
decrease as a result of repetition suppression (RS) of the fMRI blood
oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) signal. This effect has been previ-
ously described in motor processing (Grafton & Hamilton, 2007),
word reading (Dehaene et al., 2001), mathematical cognition (Salim-
poor et al., 2010), and even speech perception (Kouider et al., 2010).
In the conflict effect, we predicted that unconscious priming could
interact with response selection and influence high-level frontal areas.
Therefore, we expected greater activity in incompatible trials in the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a key region of conflict monitoring.
Material and methods
Subjects
Twenty-four healthy right-handed volunteers (six men), with no
diagnosed psychological or neurological disorders, were recruited
from the university community. Their ages ranged from 18 to
27 years, with a mean of 21 ± 2 years. The study was approved by the
Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Medicine, University of Liège,
Belgium. All volunteers gave their written informed consent prior to
their inclusion in the study, and were paid for their participation.
Task procedure
The task paradigm was adapted from that reported in Eimer &
Schlaghecken (1998). In this visuomotor task, subjects are asked to
press a response button as accurately and as quickly as possible with
their left or right hand in response to the presentation of a left-pointing
or right-pointing arrow. In each trial, this target stimulus is briefly
preceded by a prime stimulus (Fig. 1). Whereas the target stimulus is
displayed long enough to be consciously perceived, the prime stimulus
is not, because its display is short (i.e. 17 ms) and is immediately
followed by a backward mask. A high response conflict between left
and right manual responses is expected when the prime and target
arrows point in opposite directions (incompatible trials) (Aron et al.,
2003).
In each trial, the following stimuli were sequentially displayed on a
screen: fixation point, prime, mask, and target stimulus. Each trial
started with a central fixation point. Its display was pseudo-randomly
jittered between 1500 and 3000 ms. The fixation point display was
immediately followed by a blank screen and prime-arrow stimulus,
sequentially presented for 300 and 17 ms, respectively. Then, a
backward mask and two double target arrows appeared for 100 ms.
The mask consisted of 30 randomly oriented lines covering a
rectangular area centered on the prime display area on the center of
the screen. A new mask was constructed on each trial. The two double
arrows, which appeared on both sides of the mask, were imperative
stimuli prompting participants to make a rapid button press with their
left or right index finger according to the direction of these target
arrows.
Each subject was trained on a practice block of 30 trials outside the
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. The experiment included
40 compatible trials, 40 incompatible trials, 40 neutral trials (the prime
stimulus was an ‘X’ sign), 40 null events (fixation point instead of a
trial), and 80 no-response trials as part of another study (D’Ostilio &
Garraux, 2011). The outcome measures were the RT and accuracy in
response to the target stimuli. Stimuli were grouped in blocks of 36
trials presented in random order. After the completion of each block,
subjects were provided with a 20-s rest period, during which the mean
global RT during the last performed block was displayed.
The level of prime perception during the subliminal conflict task
was assessed by three independent measures. All participants were
first interviewed at the end of the main fMRI study. Second,
participants performed a prime identification task in the MRI scanner
for assessment of the level of prime perception as a function of the
prime display duration. In each trial, the stimuli (left-pointing or right-
pointing arrow) and their temporal sequence of presentation were the
same as in the main experiment, with the exception that the target
stimulus was a question mark displayed from 1 to 1.7 s after the mask.
This question mark prompted the participants to make a response with
the left or right hand within 3 s, according to the direction of the arrow
stimulus. No emphasis was placed on RT. Prime display duration
varied according to a one-down ⁄ two-up staircase procedure (Schlag-
hecken & Eimer, 2002; Schlaghecken & Sisman, 2006). The task
always started with a 167-ms display trial. In the following trials,
prime display was shortened by steps of 17 ms whenever participants
gave a correct response, and prolonged by 34 ms after an incorrect
response. In trials where the prime did not reach the level of
awareness, participants were invited to guess the response that they
felt to be the most accurate. We calculated the overall mean prime
duration and percentage of correct responses at 17 ms (Schlaghecken
& Sisman, 2006). Third, a second identification task was administered
Fig. 1. Behavioral paradigm. Example of compatible (left panel), neutral
(middle panel) and incompatible (right panel) response trials. The targets
appeared together with the mask, directly after the prime presentation. The only
difference in the three conditions was the physical properties of the 17-ms
unperceived prime.
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in the MRI scanner to 10 young healthy subjects (four men, aged
27 ± 3 years) who did not participate in the fMRI experiments. Here,
the task display was exactly the same as in the main experiment (i.e.
with target arrows), but participants were asked to guess which prime
stimulus was presented before the mask (left-pointing arrow, right-
pointing arrow, or neutral stimulus). They performed 120 trials (40 for
each stimulus type). We calculated the percentage of correct responses
in each of the three conditions.
Visual stimuli were generated and subject responses recorded with a
personal computer using cogent 2000 cognitive interface software
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK)
implemented in Matlab 6.1 (Mathworks, Sherborn, MA, USA).
Imaging data acquisition
BOLD fMRI data were acquired on a 3-T scanner (Siemens, Allegra,
Erlangen, Germany) with a T2*-sensitive gradient echoplanar imaging
(EPI) sequence (repetition time, 1170 ms; echo time, 30 ms, flip angle,
90; matrix size, 64 · 64 · 20; voxel size, 3.4 · 3.4 · 5 mm3).
Twenty 5-mm-thick slices were acquired, covering nearly the whole
brain. For each session, the first eight volumes, acquired before
stimulus presentation, were discarded to allow for T1 saturation
effects. Head movement was minimized by restraining the subject’s
head with a vacuum cushion. Stimuli were displayed on a screen
positioned at the rear of the scanner, which the subject could
comfortably see through a mirror mounted on the standard head coil.
High-resolution structural images were obtained with a T1-weighted
3DMDEFT sequence (repetition time, 7.92 ms; echo time, 2.4 ms; flip
angle, 15; matrix size, 224 · 256 · 176; voxel size, 1 · 1 · 1 mm3).
Behavioral data analysis
We computed the mean individual RT and accuracy in all conditions.
Trials with inaccurate response or RT > 1 s were excluded from the
RT and fMRI data analysis. As in previous studies (Schlaghecken &
Maylor, 2005; Seiss & Praamstra, 2006), we estimated the compat-
ibility effect by comparing the group mean RT between compatible
and incompatible trials. Comparisons with neutral trials were then
calculated in order to isolate the conflict effect (incompatible – neutral)
and the facilitation effect (compatible – neutral). Statistical signifi-
cance was assessed with repeated-measures anova on mean RT with
the condition as an intrasubject factor (Statistica 8; StatSoft, France).
In the identification tasks, t-tests were used to compare the mean
accuracy with chance performance (50% in the first identification task
and 33% in the second one). We also calculated the mean prime
duration, by averaging all prime durations for each subject after
having discarded the first 10 trials, as this is the minimum number of
steps needed to reach the 17-ms performance limit (e.g. Schlaghecken
& Sisman, 2006). This analysis allowed us to obtain a converging
value of the display duration at which participants consciously
perceive the prime on average.
Imaging data processing
Data were preprocessed and analyzed with spm8 (Wellcome Depart-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm)
implemented in matlab 7.4.0 (Mathworks). For each participant,
we first applied a slice-timing correction to compensate for the
staggered order of slices acquired by EPI. The BOLD time series was
then spatially realigned by the use of iterative rigid body transforma-
tions, which minimize the residual sum of squares between the first
and subsequent images. Imaging data from one participant were
excluded from data analysis because of significant head movement
artefacts. The mean EPI image was spatially coregistered to the
anatomical MRI image, and coregistration parameters were applied to
the realigned BOLD time series. Individual anatomical magnetic
resonance images were spatially normalized into Montreal Neurolog-
ical Institute (MNI) space (http://www.bic.mni.mcgill.ca) with the
unified segmentation approach, and the normalization parameters were
subsequently applied to the individually coregistered BOLD time
series, which was then resliced to a voxel size of 2 · 2 · 2 mm, and
finally smoothed with a 6-mm full width at half-maximum Gaussian
kernel.
fMRI data analyses
All main experimental trials were modeled as single events time-
locked on the target stimulus display onset. Each event was convolved
with a canonical hemodynamic response function and its time and
dispersion derivatives. In addition, the statistical model included six
additional regressors representing the realignment parameters from the
rigid body transformation step. A high-pass filter with a cut-off period
of 128 s was applied in order to remove the low-frequency drifts from
the time series. Serial autocorrelations were estimated with a restricted
maximum likelihood algorithm with an autoregressive model of order
1 (+ white noise). Parameter estimates and variance were derived
voxel-by-voxel, and the main effect of each condition was assessed
with t-contrasts.
We performed three-first-level analyses modeling relative activity
increases during compatible, incompatible or neutral trials as
compared with null events. We covaried for RT in order to ensure
that activity differences between experimental conditions were only
attributable to the effect of interest. In the context of a random-effect
model, in which a single measurement is obtained from each subject
(Penny et al., 2003), these individual contrast images from level one
analyses were entered in a second-level analysis. As in the behavioral
data analysis, the comparison between compatible, incompatible and
neutral trials was performed with an anova. This analysis appropri-
ately accounts for intersubject variability, and tests whether or not the
population from which our set of subjects is drawn possesses the
hypothesized effects. Group results were characterized in terms of the
probability that the difference in magnitude value in a given voxel
could occur by chance under the null hypothesis.
In the anova, we examined the effect of each condition (as
compared with baseline) at a peak threshold of P < 0.001, uncor-
rected. Following our main hypothesis (see Introduction), we next
dissociated the conflict effect from the facilitation effect by using the
contrasts ‘incompatible minus neutral’ and ‘neutral minus compati-
ble’, respectively. The results of these two analyses were masked
inclusively by the statistical parametric maps (P < 0.001 uncorrected)
modeling the effect of incompatible and neutral conditions, respec-
tively (see above). Subliminal priming effects are very small, and
corresponding brain activations are usually hard to detect. For that
reason, any results surviving a peak threshold of P < 0.005 uncor-
rected, with an extent threshold of 10 voxels in these areas, were
considered to be significant (Kouider et al., 2010). Statistical signif-
icance was also restricted by small volume corrections (SVCs) in our a
priori regions of interest (i.e. the ACC for the conflict effect and the
MPMC for the facilitation effect). The SVC was computed by using a
familywise error correction for multiple comparisons in a sphere of
diameter 10 mm centered on published coordinates of the ACC (MNI:
10, 24, 34) (Lau et al., 2006) and the peak voxel given by our
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previous experiment examining the neural correlates of automatic
motor activation with no-response conditions performed on the same
sample of subjects (MNI: 8, )2, 62) (D’Ostilio & Garraux, 2011). We
also tentatively reported activations in other brain regions, but those




We were confident that the primes were not consciously perceived. At
interview, after fMRI, participants all denied having perceived any
stimulus immediately preceding the mask stimulus during the
subliminal priming task. This impression was confirmed by the results
of identification task analyses. For the participants of this experiment,
the mean prime duration was 35.62 ms. They responded, on average,
to 36 stimuli displayed at 17 ms, as opposed to 44 for the other prime
durations. In a staircase task, if they had really seen the prime, they
should have more responses to the 17-ms prime stimulus than to other
prime duration stimuli. In order to enhance the power of the statistical
analysis, we added the results of 23 supplementary subjects who
performed the task in the same conditions. When the prime arrow was
presented for 17 ms, response accuracy did not differ significantly
from chance level (mean percentage correct responses at
17 ms = 54.7%, t46 = 1.46, P > 0.1) (Fig. 2A). A second identifica-
tion task, with the same timing and stimuli as the main task,
administered in the MRI scanner to 10 young healthy subjects who did
not participate in the fMRI experiment, also demonstrated that the
masked prime displayed at 17 ms was subliminal (mean percentage
correct responses at 17 ms = 31.7%, t9 = 0.79, P > 0.4) (Fig. 2b).
Altogether, these results support the view that prime stimuli were
unlikely to be consciously perceived by the participants during the
main task.
Main task
The main effect of condition was statistically significant (F2,46 = 7.72,
P = 0.001) in such a way that, relative to neutral trials (mean RT =
375 ± 38 ms), RT was shorter in compatible trials (mean RT = 369 ±
38 ms) and longer in incompatible trials (mean RT = 383 ± 30 ms)
(unilateral tests: compatibility effect = 14; incompatible > compati-
ble, t23 = 3.42, P = 0.001; incompatible > neutral, t23 = 2.38, P =
0.013; neutral > compatible, t23 = 1.90, P = 0.035). The results are
illustrated in Fig. 3. Accuracy rate showed a similar tendency, but no
statistical inference was made, given the small number of errors.
Imaging data
Figure 4 shows significant differences in BOLD signal for the
compatible, neutral and incompatible conditions in comparison with
the baseline condition (null events). The pattern of activation revealed
an involvement of cognitive control regions, notably the ACC, during
incompatible trials, but reduced activity in the MPMC during
compatible trials. The main effect of the anova is reported in
Table S1. To examine the compatibility effect-related activity, we
contrasted the BOLD response between incompatible and compatible
trials. We found stronger activity in our a priori defined region, the
ACC (x = 10, y = 26, z = 28, T = 4.89, P = 0.000003), and also in
two related high-level cognitive areas, the right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) (x = 34, y = 48, z = 38, T = 3.30, P = 0.0007) and
inferior parietal cortex (x = 66, y = )30, z = 38, T = 3.69,
P = 0.0002). The complete results for this contrast are reported in
Table S2. We isolated the conflict effect by comparing incompatible
trials with neutral trials (Table 1; Fig. 5). The facilitation effect was
assessed by contrasting neutral trials with compatible trials. We found
smaller activation in compatible trials in the medial and dorsal
A
B
Fig. 2. (A) Accuracy rate in the first prime identification task, plotted
separately for each prime duration. Participants were only unable to discrim-
inate the arrow direction for the 17-ms prime (chance-level performance).
(B) Accuracy rate in the second prime identification task (10 participants) for each





















Fig. 3. Behavioral results. Mean RTs in the three experimental conditions.
The RT in incompatible trials was significantly longer than that in the other two
conditions. Vertical bars represent standard errors.
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premotor cortex as a result of RS of the BOLD signal. The results are
reported in Table 2 and Fig. 5.
Discussion
In this event-related fMRI experiment, the BOLD signal was
measured in healthy individuals under three main experimental
conditions that differed only by the physical properties of a stimulus
presented below the threshold of awareness (Fig. 1). The effect of
these stimuli was nevertheless strong enough to induce differences in
RT (Fig. 3) and BOLD signal (Fig. 4) between conditions. As in
previous studies (Botvinick et al., 1999; Seiss & Praamstra, 2004; Lau
et al., 2006), the compatibility effect was measured by comparing RT
differences between compatible and incompatible conditions. In
agreement with findings in conflict tasks elicited by supraliminal
stimuli such as in the EFT, we observed a longer RT and stronger
ACC activation in incompatible trials. In addition, other high-level
brain areas, such as the right DLPFC and right parietal cortex, were
also more strongly activated in incompatible trials. The main
prediction of the present study was that the difference between
incompatible and compatible trials might be subserved by the
combination of several processes, namely the automatic activation
of competing motor plans, response conflict (i.e. in incompatible
trials), and response facilitation (i.e. in compatible trials).
We have evidence suggesting that unconscious conflict processing
was indeed an important component embedded in the task. This was
supported by the results of the comparison with neutral trials defined
by the presence of a prime stimulus that has not been previously
associated with any specific motor response. The RT was longer in
incompatible than in neutral trials (Fig. 3). This RT difference was
associated with stronger activations in the ACC and DLPFC in
incompatible than in neutral trials, suggesting that these regions were
specifically involved in unconscious and automatic conflict processing
(Fig. 5). As conflict processing is one of the most important functions
subserved by the frontal lobes, our result may have important
implications for the role of the frontal lobes in unconscious cognitive
control in general.
Fig. 4. BOLD activations in the three experimental conditions (compatible, neutral, and incompatible) minus baseline, displayed at a statistical threshold of
P < 0.001 uncorrected. In incompatible trials, the intensity and extent of the activation were higher in the ACC and the DLPFC. In compatible trials, activity in the
premotor system was reduced.









x, y, z (mm)
SVC P
(corrected)
Right DLPFC 61 4.01 0.00008 44, 32, 42
Right precuneus 74 3.59 0.0003 8, )70, 50
Right ACC 45 3.59 0.0003 8, 28, 28 0.024
Right insula 12 3.29 0.0008 38, 4, )2
Right middle frontal cortex 56 3.25 0.0009 36, 36, 26
Right ACC 15 3.15 0.0012 6, 36, 20
Right insula 11 2.92 0.0024 36, 18, 2
Right superior parietal cortex 14 2.92 0.0024 38, )64, 58
Right middle cingulate cortex 16 2.84 0.0030 2, )10, 32
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The present results help to resolve discrepancies between previous
functional imaging studies examining the involvement of the ACC in
response conflict when this conflict is not consciously perceived. In
agreement with the theory that the prefrontal cortex (Norman &
Shallice, 1986) and even the ACC (Alexander et al., 2007) belong to a
supervisory system that is able to guide only conscious controlled
actions, Dehaene et al. (2003) did not find stronger ACC BOLD
activity in the incompatible condition than in the compatible condition
in a subliminal masked prime task. However, this negative result has
been questioned, because it cannot be interpreted as a proof of the null
hypothesis, and because of the robust ACC activation not only in
incompatible but also, unexpectedly, in compatible trials as compared
with baseline (Ursu et al., 2008). In an event-related potential study,
Praamstra & Seiss (2005) identified a candidate N2 component, a
negative wave that may originate in the ACC (Klopp et al., 1996; Van
Veen & Carter, 2002; Gajewski et al., 2008), in the conflict condition,
but this was interpreted as a response artefact. In our opinion, none of
those studies provide enough evidence to reject a role of the ACC and
other frontal lobe regions in unconscious conflict. Conversely, the
opposite prediction has received indirect support from two other
studies. Hughes et al. (2009) observed that the N2 component was
modulated as a function of the stimulus compatibility. In that study,
one arrow direction was associated with a no-go response, making
difficult the interpretation of results as being attributable to a conflict
effect or primed inhibition processes. In an fMRI study, Ursu et al.
(2008) used a serial response task with an implicit probabilistic
Fig. 5. Comparison of BOLD signal changes during incompatible trials vs. neutral trials (left panel) and neutral trials vs. compatible trials (right panel). The conflict
effect was related to high-level activation of brain areas, notably the ACC (left plot) and the DLPFC, whereas the facilitation effect was subserved by reduced
activation in a motor preparation network including the MPMC (right plot). Results are displayed at a peak threshold of P < 0.005 uncorrected, an extent threshold of
P < 0.005 uncorrected, and an extent threshold of 10 continuous voxels.









x, y, z (mm)
SVC P
(corrected)
Left postcentral gyrus ⁄ primary motor cortex 141 4.22 0.00004 )60, )20, 32
Left premotor cortex 179 4.00 0.00008 )20, )4, 62
Right cerebellum 26 3.96 0.00009 8, )52, )8
Left inferior parietal cortex 82 3.84 0.0001 )42, )26, 44
Left superior parietal cortex 45 3.81 0.0002 )30, )50, 62
Right premotor cortex 39 3.37 0.0006 36, )10, 60
MPMC (right supplementary motor area) 69 3.25 0.0009 6, 0, 58 0.014
MPMC (left supplementary motor area) 34 3.19 0.0011 )6, )2, 52
Right supramarginal gyrus 16 3.16 0.0012 62, )28, 34
Left thalamus 10 3.04 0.0017 )20, )14, 2
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learning rule, and found that the ACC was more activated in trials that
violated the sequence than in trials where stimuli followed the
sequence. However, the differential activation in those studies cannot
be solely interpreted as a result of an unconscious conflict effect, as
several other processes, including motor learning and response to
novelty, were likely to be embedded in that task. Unlike these studies,
the present study design allowed separation of the conflict effect from
other processes embedded in the task.
The processing of unconscious conflict is poorly understood. Some
authors argue for reciprocal inhibition processes involving only the
motor system (Praamstra & Seiss, 2005), whereas others suggest
involvement of the frontal cognitive system, through attentional
neuromodulation (e.g. Sohrabi & West, 2009). In line with the latter
theory, we showed a pattern of activation similar to what happens in
traditional interference task such as the Stroop task, the EFT, or the
Simon task (Wager et al., 2005; Nee et al., 2007), suggesting that
unconscious information can influence the cognitive control system.
According to Coulthard et al. (2008a), the right parietal cortex might
interact with prefrontal regions to influence response choice when
conflicting responses are in competition. The prefrontal cortex is
considered to be the highest cortical area, because of its substantial
involvement in executive functioning (Collette et al., 2006). Although
the activities of these two regions seem to be closely related, they
probably have distinct roles. According to current models, the ACC
has, rather, an evaluative function (MacDonald et al., 2000) that
enables the lateral prefrontal cortex to implement control trough
inhibitory mechanisms (Hazeltine et al., 2000; Nee et al., 2007).
Taken together, these results, including ours, do not support the
prediction that the ACC and other frontal lobe regions are exclusively
involved in conscious cognitive control. Our finding therefore
suggests that these regions implement processes that finally serve to
reduce competition between different response alternatives, whatever
the level of perception of stimuli.
Additionally, our results extend those from previous imaging
studies showing that certain executive functions, such as stop signal
inhibition or performance monitoring, could be unconsciously mod-
ulated by frontal brain regions involved in conscious cognitive control
frontal processes (Lau & Passingham, 2007; Van Gaal et al.,
2008,2010; Pavone et al., 2009). Van Gaal et al. (2008) demonstrated
that a masked no-go stimulus could elicit a frontal inhibitory event-
related potential that correlated with the slowed responses to these
stimuli. More recently, the same authors implemented this paradigm in
an fMRI study, whose results corroborated the involvement of frontal
inhibitory processes in unconscious cognitive control, especially the
inferior frontal cortex and the presupplementary motor area. In another
study, Pavone et al. (2009) showed that an unconscious error could
produce an even-related negativity potential, which is considered to be
be a neural correlate of error processing (Gehring et al., 1993) that is
probably generated by the ACC (Taylor et al., 2007).
A role of frontal regions in unconscious conflict is also supported by
lesion studies in neurological populations. Patients with damage to the
frontal lobes may show delayed responses in incompatible trials on the
EFT (Coulthard et al., 2008a). In addition to impaired controlled
cognitive processes, these patients also display deficits in unconscious
and automatic inhibition mechanisms (Sumner et al., 2007; Coulthard
et al., 2008b). This is also in line with behavioral studies performed in
another population with frontal lobe dysfunction, Parkinson disease
patients, who showed enhanced susceptibility to both conscious
(Praamstra et al., 1999; Wylie et al., 2005) and unconscious (Seiss &
Praamstra, 2004, 2006) triggered interference. This impairment might
result from the ACC hypoactivation, which is broadly connected to the
basal ganglia (Playford et al., 1992).
Apart from the conflict effect, we also isolated the facilitation effect
by comparing RT and BOLD signal changes between compatible and
neutral trials. The RT was shorter in compatible than in neutral trials
(Fig. 3). We found that the medial and lateral premotor cortices were
less activated in compatible trials (Fig. 5). This can be explained by an
RS phenomenon characterized by a reduction in activity for repeated
as compared with new stimuli (Henson & Rugg, 2003; Horner &
Henson, 2008). Recently, Hamilton & Grafton (2009) demonstrated
that suppression of the BOLD signal could occur across the motor
network, especially in the premotor system. Additionally, RS was
described in some subliminal priming experiments on word reading
with reduced activity in word-processing areas (Dehaene et al., 2001;
Kouider et al., 2007). Here, we showed that RS can also occur at a
motor level, even when there is no awareness of stimulus repetition.
Reduced activation of the thalamus was also found in the compatible
condition. This region belongs to cortico-basal ganglia loops involved
in motor control, in the same manner as the MPMC (Aron et al.,
2009). This finding extends the results of our previous study
concerning the neural correlates of automatic motor activation, an
adaptive process facilitating efficient interaction with environmental
stimuli (D’Ostilio & Garraux, 2011) that occurred in the MPMC. One
of the roles of the MPMC is to contribute to the automatic activation
of environmental stimuli strongly associated with a preponderant
response, in order to facilitate the corresponding action if the
movement must be quickly executed. The present results clearly
demonstrate that MPMC activity is modulated by action priming.
In conclusion, these findings provide new insights into unconscious
priming processing. The difference in RT between compatible and
incompatible trials is explained, respectively, by facilitation and conflict
effects mediated by different brain regions. We showed that the
facilitation effect was associated with decreased activity in several brain
areas, notably the MPMC. This finding is in line with our previous
results on automatic motor activation. We also demonstrated that the
dorsal ACC and other frontal brain areas were automatically and
mechanically activated by any conflict situation, when the conflict was
not consciously elicited. This calls into question the classical theories
that consider consciousness and cognitive control to be intimately
related, as well as the exclusive involvement of the frontal cortex in
conscious processing of information. To our knowledge, this is the first
time that a clear dissociation between a motor and a cognitive network
has been revealed with subliminal masked priming. However, it has
been suggested that participants may be aware of different levels of
subjective conflict in some priming tasks, in such away that, even if they
did not perceive the prime, they could detect a difference in the
perception of task difficulty (Wenke et al., 2010). Therefore, we cannot
exclude the possibility that related brain activity reached the threshold of
awareness, even if it is driven by subliminal visual stimuli.
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